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Abstract. We introduce a unifying model to study the impact of worst-
case latency deviations in non-atomic selfish routing games. In our model,
latencies are subject to (bounded) deviations which are taken into ac-
count by the players. The quality deterioration caused by such deviations
is assessed by the Deviation Ratio, i.e., the worst case ratio of the cost
of a Nash flow with respect to deviated latencies and the cost of a Nash
flow with respect to the unaltered latencies. This notion is inspired by the
Price of Risk Aversion recently studied by Nikolova and Stier-Moses [15].
Here we generalize their model and results. In particular, we derive tight
bounds on the Deviation Ratio for multi-commodity instances with a
common source and arbitrary non-negative and non-decreasing latency
functions. These bounds exhibit a linear dependency on the size of the
network (besides other parameters). In contrast, we show that for gen-
eral multi-commodity networks an exponential dependency is inevitable.
We also improve recent smoothness results to bound the Price of Risk
Aversion.
Keywords: selfish routing games, uncertainty, deviations, price of risk aversion,
biased price of anarchy, network tolls
1 Introduction
In the classical selfish routing game introduced by Wardrop [19], there is an (in-
finitely) large population of (non-atomic) players who selfishly choose minimum
latency paths in a network with flow-dependent latency functions. An assump-
tion that is made in this model is that the latency functions are given deter-
ministically. Although being a meaningful abstraction (which also facilitates the
analysis of such games), this assumption is overly simplistic in situations where
latencies are subject to deviations which are taken into account by the players.
In this paper, we study how much the quality of a Nash flow deteriorates
in the worst case under (bounded) deviations of the latency functions. More
precisely, given an instance of the selfish routing game with latency functions
(la)a∈A on the arcs, we define the Deviation Ratio (DR) as the worst case ratio
C(f δ)/C(f0) of a Nash flow f δ with respect to deviated latency functions (la +
δa)a∈A, where (δa)a∈A are arbitrary deviation functions from a feasible set, and
a Nash flow f0 with respect to the unaltered latency functions (la)a∈A. Here the
social cost function C refers to the total average latency (without the deviations).
Our motivation for studying this social cost function is that a central designer
usually cares about the long-term performance of the system (accounting for the
average latency or pollution). On the other hand, the players typically do not
know the exact latencies and use estimates or include “safety margins” in their
planning. Similar viewpoints are adopted in [12, 15].
In order to model bounded deviations, we extend an idea previously put
forward by Bonifaci, Salek and Scha¨fer [2] in the context of the restricted network
toll problem: We assume that for every arc a ∈ A we are given lower and upper
bound restrictions θmina and θ
max
a , respectively, and call a deviation δa feasible if
θmina (x) ≤ δa(x) ≤ θ
max
a (x) for all x ≥ 0.
Our notion of the Deviation Ratio is inspired by and builds upon the Price of
Risk Aversion (PRA) recently introduced by Nikolova and Stier-Moses [15]. The
authors investigate selfish routing games with uncertain latencies by considering
deviations of the form δa = γva, where γ ≥ 0 is the risk-aversion of the players
and va is the variance of some random variable with mean zero. They derive
upper bounds on the Price of Risk Aversion for single-commodity networks with
arbitrary non-negative and non-decreasing latency functions if the variance-to-
mean-ratio va/la of every arc a ∈ A is bounded by some constant κ ≥ 0. It is not
hard to see that their model is a special case of our model if we choose θmina = 0
and θmaxa = γκla (see Section 2 for more details).
Our contributions. The main contributions presented in this paper are as follows:
1. Upper bounds: We derive a general upper bound on the Deviation Ratio for
multi-commodity networks with a common source and arbitrary non-negative
and non-decreasing latency functions (Theorem 3).
In order to prove this upper bound, we first generalize a result by Bonifaci
et al. [2] characterizing the inducibility of a fixed flow by δ-deviations to multi-
commodity networks with a common source (Theorem 2). This characterization
naturally gives rise to the concept of an alternating path, which plays a crucial
role in the work by Nikolova and Stier-Moses [15] and was first used by Lin,
Roughgarden, Tardos and Walkover [11] in the context of the network design
problem.
We then specialize our bound to the case of so-called (α, β)-deviations, where
θmina = αla and θ
max
a = βla with −1 < α ≤ 0 ≤ β. We prove that the Deviation
Ratio is at most 1+(β−α)/(1+α)⌈(n−1)/2⌉r, where n is the number of nodes
of the network and r is the sum of the demands of the commodities (Theorem 3).
In particular, this reveals that the Deviation Ratio depends linearly on the size
of the underlying network (among other parameters).
By using this result, we obtain a bound on the Price of Risk Aversion (The-
orem 6) which generalizes the one in [15] in two ways: (i) it holds for multi-
commodity networks with a common source and (ii) it allows for negative risk-
aversion parameters (i.e., capturing risk-taking players as well). Further, we show
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that our result can be used to bound the relative error in social cost incurred by
small latency perturbations (Theorem 7), which is of independent interest.
2. Lower bounds: We prove that our bound on the Deviation Ratio for (α, β)-
deviations is best possible. More specifically, for single-commodity networks we
show that our bound is tight in all its parameters. Our lower bound construction
holds for arbitrary n ∈ N and is based on the generalized Braess graph [17]
(Example 1). In particular, this complements a recent result by Lianeas, Nikolova
and Stier-Moses [10] who show that their bound on the Price of Risk Aversion
is tight for single-commodity networks with n = 2j nodes for all j ∈ N.
Further, for multi-commodity networks with a common source we show that
our bound is tight in all parameters if n is odd, while a small gap remains if n
is even (Theorem 4). Finally, for general multi-commodity graphs we establish a
lower bound showing that the Deviation Ratio can be exponential in n (Theorem
5). In particular, this shows that there is an exponential gap between the cases of
multi-commodity networks with and without a common source. In our proof, we
adapt a graph structure used by Lin, Roughgarden, Tardos and Walkover [11]
in their lower bound construction for the network design problem on multi-
commodity networks (see also [17]).
3. Smoothness bounds: We improve (and slightly generalize) recent smoothness
bounds on the Price of Risk Aversion given by Meir and Parkes [12] and inde-
pendently by Lianeas et al. [10]. In particular, we derive tight bounds for the
Biased Price of Anarchy (BPoA) [12], i.e., the ratio between the cost of a devi-
ated Nash flow and the cost of a social optimum, for arbitrary (0, β)-deviations
(Theorem 8).3 Note that the Biased Price of Anarchy yields an upper bound on
the Deviation Ratio/Price of Risk Aversion. We also derive smoothness results
for general path deviations (which are not representable by arc deviations). As
a result, we obtain bounds on the Price of Risk Aversion (Theorem 9) under the
non-linear mean-std model [10, 15] (see Section 2).
It is interesting to note that the smoothness bounds on the Biased Price of
Anarchy [12] and the Price of Risk Aversion [10] are independent of the network
structure (but dependent on the class of latency functions). In contrast, the
bound on the Deviation Ratio depends on certain parameters of the network.4
Our results answer a question posed in the work by Nikolova and Stier-Moses
[15] regarding possible relations between their Price of Risk Aversion model [15],
the restricted network toll problem [2], and the network design problem [17]. In
particular, our results also show that the analysis in [15] is not inherent to the
used variance function, but rather depends on the restrictions imposed on the
feasible deviations.
3 We remark that for certain types of (0, β)-deviations, e.g., scaled marginal tolls,
better bounds can be obtained; see the section “Related notions” in Section 2 for
relevant literature.
4 For example, there are parallel-arc networks for which the Biased Price of Anarchy
is unbounded, whereas the Deviation Ratio is a constant.
3
Related work. The modeling and studying of uncertainties in routing games has
received a lot of attention in recent years. An extensive survey on this topic is
given by Cominetti [6].
As mentioned above, our investigations are inspired by the study of the Price
of Risk Aversion by Nikolova and Stier-Moses [15]. They prove that for single-
commodity instances with non-negative and non-decreasing latency functions
the Price of Risk Aversion is at most 1 + γκ⌈(n− 1)/2⌉. We elaborate in more
detail on the connections to their work in Section 2.
There are several papers that study the problem of imposing tolls (which
can be viewed as latency deviations, see Section 2 for more details) on the arcs
of a network to reduce the cost of the resulting Nash flow. Conceptually, our
model is related to the restricted network toll problem by Bonifaci et al. [2].
The authors study the problem of computing non-negative tolls that have to
obey some upper bound restrictions (θa)a∈A such that the cost of the resulting
Nash flow is minimized. This is tantamount to computing best-case deviations
in our model with θmina = 0 and θ
max
a = θa. In contrast, our focus here is on
worst-case deviations. As a side result, we prove that computing such worst-case
deviations is NP-hard, even for single-commodity instances with linear latencies
(Theorem 1).
Roughgarden [17] studies the network design problem of finding a subnet-
work that minimizes the latency of all flow-carrying paths of the resulting Nash
flow. He proves that the trivial algorithm (which simply returns the original net-
work) gives an ⌊n/2⌋-approximation algorithm for single-commodity networks
and that this is best possible (unless P = NP). Later, Lin et al. [11] show that
this algorithm can be exponentially bad for multi-commodity networks. The in-
stances that we use in our lower bound constructions are based on the ones used
in [11, 17].
Meir and Parkes [12] and independently Lineas et al. [10] show that for non-
atomic network routing games with (1, µ)-smooth5 latency functions it holds that
PRA ≤ BPoA ≤ (1 + γκ)/(1 − µ). An advantage of such bounds is that they
hold for general multi-commodity instances (but depend on the class of latency
functions). These bounds stand in contrast to the topological bounds obtained
here and by Nikolova and Stier-Moses [15] which hold for arbitrary non-negative
and non-decreasing latency functions.
2 Preliminaries
Bounded deviation model. Let I = (G = (V,A), (la)a∈A, (si, ti)i∈[k], (ri)i∈[k]) be
an instance of a non-atomic network routing game. Here, G = (V,A) is a directed
graph with node set V and arc set A ⊆ V ×V , where each arc a ∈ A has a non-
negative, non-decreasing and continuous latency function la : R≥0 → R≥0. Each
commodity i ∈ [k] is associated with a source-destination pair (si, ti) and has
5 Meir and Parkes [12] define a function l to be (1, µ)-smooth if xl(y) ≤ µyl(y)+xl(x)
for all x, y ≥ 0 (which is slightly different from Roughgarden’s original smoothness
definition [18]). Lineas et al. [10] only require local smoothness where y is taken fixed.
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a demand of ri ∈ R>0. We assume that ti 6= tj if i 6= j for i, j ∈ [k]. If all
commodities share a common source node, i.e., si = sj = s for all i, j ∈ [k], we
call I a common source multi-commodity instance (with source s). We assume
without loss of generality that 1 = r1 ≤ r2 ≤ · · · ≤ rk and define r =
∑
i∈[k] ri.
We denote by Pi the set of all simple (si, ti)-paths of commodity i ∈ [k]
in G, and we define P = ∪i∈[k]Pi. An outcome of the game is a feasible flow
f : P → R≥0, i.e.,
∑
P∈Pi
fP = ri for every i ∈ [k]. Given a flow f = (f
i)i∈[k],
we use f ia to denote the total flow on arc a ∈ A of commodity i ∈ [k], i.e.,
f ia =
∑
P∈Pi:a∈P
fP . The total flow on arc a ∈ A is defined as fa =
∑
i∈[k] f
i
a.
The latency of a path P ∈ P with respect to f is defined as lP (f) :=
∑
a∈P la(fa).
The social cost C(f) of a flow f is given by its total average latency, i.e., C(f) =∑
P∈P fP lP (f) =
∑
a∈A fala(fa). A flow that minimizes C(·) is called (socially)
optimal. We use A+i = {a ∈ A : f
i
a > 0} to refer to the support of f
i for
commodity i ∈ [k] and define A+ = ∪i∈[k]A
+
i as the support of f .
For every arc a ∈ A, we have a continuous function δa : R≥0 → R modeling
the deviation on arc a, and we write δ = (δa)a∈A. We define the deviation of
a path P ∈ P as δP (f) =
∑
a∈P δa(fa). The deviated latency on arc a ∈ A is
given by qa(fa) = la(fa)+ δa(fa); similarly, the deviated latency on path P ∈ P
is given by qP (f) = lP (f) + δP (f). We say that f is δ-inducible if and only if it
is a Wardrop flow (or Nash flow) with respect to l + δ, i.e.,
∀i ∈ [k], ∀P ∈ Pi, fP > 0 : qP (f) ≤ qP ′(f) ∀P
′ ∈ Pi. (1)
If f is δ-inducible, we also write f = f δ. Note that a Nash flow f for the unaltered
latencies (la)a∈A is 0-inducible, i.e., f = f
0.
Let θmin = (θmina )a∈A and θ
max = (θmaxa )a∈A be given continuous threshold
functions satisfying θmina (x) ≤ 0 ≤ θ
max
a (x) for all x ≥ 0 and a ∈ A, and let
θ = (θmin, θmax). We define ∆(θ) = {(δa)a∈A | ∀a ∈ A : θ
min
a (x) ≤ δa(x) ≤
θmaxa (x), ∀x ≥ 0} as the set of feasible deviations. Note that 0 ∈ ∆(θ) for
all threshold functions θmin and θmax. We say that δ ∈ ∆(θ) is a θ-deviation.
Furthermore, f is θ-inducible if there exists a δ ∈ ∆(θ) such that f is δ-inducible.
For −1 < α ≤ 0 ≤ β, we call δ ∈ ∆(θ) an (α, β)-deviation if θmin = αl and
θmax = βl, and also write θ = (α, β).
We make the following assumption throughout the paper:
Assumption 1. We assume that la(x) + θ
min
a (x) ≥ 0 for all x ≥ 0 and a ∈ A.
The restrictions imposed on the deviations naturally give rise to the following
two optimization problems. We emphasize that in both problems the social cost
function C(·) only takes into account the latencies but not the deviations.
1. Best Deviation Problem: compute a deviation δ ∈ ∆(θ) which minimizes
inf{C(f δ) : δ ∈ ∆(θ)}. If f δ is not unique, we assume that C(f δ) refers to
the social cost of the best Nash flow.
2. Worst Deviation Problem: compute a deviation δ ∈ ∆(θ) which maximizes
sup{C(f δ) : δ ∈ ∆(θ)}. If f δ is not unique, we assume that C(f δ) refers to
the social cost of the worst Nash flow.
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We (implicitly) assume that only deviations δ are considered for which a
Nash flow exists. We briefly elaborate on the existence when θmin = 0 and θmaxa
is non-negative, non-decreasing and continuous for all a ∈ A. It is not hard to see
that for a deviated Nash flow f δ there exists some 0 ≤ λa ≤ 1 for every arc a ∈ A
such that δa(f
δ
a ) = λaθ
max
a (f
δ
a). In particular, this means that δ
′ ∈ ∆(θ) defined
by δ′a = λaθ
max
a also induces f
δ. Therefore it is sufficient to consider deviations
of the form δa = λaθ
max
a where 0 ≤ λa ≤ 1 for all a ∈ A. As a consequence,
it follows that qa = la + δa is a non-negative, non-decreasing and continuous
function for all a ∈ A. It is well-known that for these types of functions, the
existence of a Nash flow is guaranteed (see, e.g., Nisan et al. [16]).
Deviation Ratio. Given an instance I and threshold functions θ = (θmin, θmax),
we define the Deviation Ratio DR(I, θ) = supδ∈∆(θ)C(f
δ)/C(f0) as the worst-
case ratio of the cost of a θ-inducible flow and the cost of a 0-inducible flow.
Intuitively, DR(I, θ) measures the worst-case deterioration of the social cost of
a Nash flow due to (feasible) latency deviations.
Note that for fixed deviations δ ∈ ∆(θ), there might be multiple Nash flows
that are δ-inducible. In this case, we adopt the convention that C(f δ) refers to
the social cost of the worst Nash flow that is δ-inducible.
Our main focus in this paper is on establishing (tight) bounds on the Devia-
tion Ratio. As a side-result, we prove that the problem of determining worst-case
deviations is NP-hard.
Theorem 1. It is NP-hard to compute deviations δ ∈ ∆(θ) such that C(f δ) is
maximized, even for single-commodity networks with linear latencies.
Related notions. The best deviation problem is a direct generalization of the
restricted network toll problem introduced by Bonifaci et al. [2]. We obtain this
model for θmin = 0. The deviations are interpreted as non-negative tolls on the
arcs. The objective minimized in [2] is measured against the social optimum,
i.e., the authors are interested in the ratio C(f δ)/C(f∗), where f∗ is an optimal
flow for the instance I. Also, our definition of (0, β)-deviations is equivalent to
the definition of β-restricted tolls in [2].
Hoefer et al. [9] consider the taxing subnetwork problem, which is a special
case of the restricted network toll problem. Here only a designated subset of the
arcs can be tolled, which is equivalent to θmina = 0 and θ
max
a ∈ {0,∞} for all
a ∈ A. They show that best deviation problem is NP-complete, even for two
commodities. To the best of our knowledge, the single-commodity case is still an
open problem. On the positive side, Hoefer et al. [9] and Bonifaci et al. [2] give
polynomial time algorithms for parallel-arc networks, solving the best deviation
problem for their respective definitions of the threshold functions.
Lastly, the work by Fotakis et al. [8] can technically be seen as an (approx-
imation) variant of the restricted toll model, in which the tolls are interpreted
as risk-averse behavior of players. Here, we have θmina = 0 and θ
max
a = γla for all
a ∈ A. Furthermore, deviations of the form δa(x) = γala(x) are considered for
0 ≤ γa ≤ γ for all a ∈ A.
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Beckmann et al. [1] proved that the social optimum can be induced as a Nash
flow using marginal tolls, that is, by setting δa(x) = x · l
′
a(x), where l
′
a(x) is the
derivative of la(x) (assuming the existence of l
′
a). In particular, if these tolls are
feasible, i.e., δ ∈ ∆(θ), then δ is an optimal solution for the best deviation prob-
lem. An extension of this setting, which has been studied intensively recently, is
to consider perceived latencies of the form la(x) + ρ · xl
′
a(x) for some parameter
ρ ∈ R, i.e., we take δa(x) = ρ · xl
′
a(x). This type of deviation can be interpreted
in many ways. If there exists a ρ such that (ρ · xl′a(x))a∈A ∈ ∆(θ), then this
deviation gives an approximation for the best deviation problem. Results that
are related to this are [3–5, 8, 12, 13].
Nikolova and Stier-Moses [15] (see also [10, 14]) consider non-atomic net-
work routing games with uncertain latencies. Here the deviations correspond
to variances (va)a∈A of some random variable ζa (with expectation zero). The
perceived latency of a path P ∈ P with respect to a flow f is then defined as
qγP (f) = lP (f) + γvP (f), where γ ≥ 0 is a parameter representing the risk-
aversion of the players. They consider two different objectives as to how the de-
viation vP (f) of a path P is defined: vP (f) =
∑
a∈P va(fa), called the mean-var
objective, and vP (f) = (
∑
a∈P va(fa))
1/2, called the mean-std objective. Note
that for the mean-var objective there is an equivalent arc-based definition, where
the perceived latency of every arc a ∈ A is defined as qγa (fa) = la(fa) + γva(fa).
They define the Price of Risk Aversion [15] as the worst-case ratio C(x)/C(z),
where x is a risk-averse Nash flow with respect to qγ = l + γv and z is a
risk-neutral Nash flow with respect to l.6 In their analysis, it is assumed that
the variance-to-mean-ratio of every arc a ∈ A under the risk-averse flow x is
bounded by some constant κ ≥ 0, i.e., va(xa) ≤ κla(xa) for all a ∈ A. Under this
assumption, they prove that the Price of Risk Aversion PRA(I, γ, κ) of single-
commodity instances I with non-negative and non-decreasing latency functions
is at most 1 + γκ⌈(n− 1)/2⌉, where n is the number of nodes.
We now elaborate on the relation to our Deviation Ratio. The main technical
difference is that in [15] the variance-to-mean ratio is only considered for the
respective flow values xa. Note however that if we write for every a ∈ A, va(xa) =
λala(xa) for some 0 ≤ λa ≤ κ, then the deviation function δa(y) = γλala(y) has
the property that x = f δ is δ-inducible with δ ∈ ∆(0, γκ). It follows that for
every instance I and parameters γ, κ, PRA(I, γ, κ) ≤ DR(I, (0, γκ)).
Another related notion is the Biased Price of Anarchy (BPoA) introduced
by Meir and Parkes [12]. Adapted to our setting, given an instance I and
threshold functions θ, the Biased Price of Anarchy is defined as BPoA(I, θ) =
supδ∈∆(θ) C(f
δ)/C(f∗), where f∗ is a socially optimal flow. Note that because
C(f∗) ≤ C(f) for every feasible flow f , we have DR(I, θ) ≤ BPoA(I, θ).
Due to space limitations, some material is omitted from the main text and can
be found in the appendix.
6 The existence of a risk-averse Nash flow is proven in [14].
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3 Upper bounds on the Deviation Ratio
We derive an upper bound on the Deviation Ratio. All results in this section
hold for multi-commodity instances with a common source.
We first derive a characterization result for the inducibility of a given flow f .
This generalizes the characterization in [2] to common source multi-commodity
instances and negative deviations. We define an auxiliary graph Gˆ = Gˆ(f) =
(V, Aˆ) with Aˆ = A∪ A¯, where A¯ = {(v, u) : a = (u, v) ∈ A+}. That is, Aˆ consists
of the set of arcs in A, which we call forward arcs, and the set A¯ of arcs (v, u)
with (u, v) ∈ A+, which we call reversed arcs. Further, we define a cost function
c : Aˆ→ R as follows:
ca =
{
l(u,v)(fa) + θ
max
(u,v)(fa) for a = (u, v) ∈ A
−l(u,v)(fa)− θ
min
(u,v)(fa) for a = (v, u) ∈ A¯.
(2)
Theorem 2. Let f be a feasible flow. Then f is θ-inducible if and only if Gˆ(f)
does not contain a cycle of negative cost with respect to c.
Theorem 2 does not hold for general multi-commodity instances (see Remark
1 in the appendix). The proof of Lemma 1 follows directly from Theorem 2.
Lemma 1. Let x be θ-inducible and let Xi be a flow-carrying (s, ti)-path for
commodity i ∈ [k] in G. Let χ and ψ be any (s, ti)-path and (ti, s)-path in Gˆ(x),
respectively. Then∑
a∈Xi
la(xa) + θ
min
a (xa) ≤
∑
a∈χ∩A
la(xa) + θ
max
a (xa)−
∑
a∈χ∩A¯
la(xa) + θ
min
a (xa)
∑
a∈Xi
la(xa) + θ
max
a (xa) ≥
∑
a∈ψ∩A¯
la(xa) + θ
min
a (xa)−
∑
a∈ψ∩A
la(xa) + θ
max
a (xa).
The following notion of alternating paths turns out to be crucial. It was first
introduced by Lin et al. [11] and is also used by Nikolova and Stier-Moses [15].
Definition 1 (Alternating path [11,15]). Let x and z be feasible flows. We
partition A = X ∪ Z, where Z = {a ∈ A : za ≥ xa and za > 0} and X = {a ∈
A : za < xa or za = xa = 0}. We say that πi = (a1, . . . , ar) is an alternating
s, ti-path if the arcs in πi ∩Z are oriented in the direction of ti, and the arcs in
πi ∩X are oriented in the direction of s.
Without loss of generality we may remove all arcs with za = xa = 0 (as they
do not contribute to the social cost). Note that if along πi we reverse the arcs
of Z then the resulting path is a directed (ti, s)-path in Gˆ(z) (which we call the
s-oriented version of πi); similarly, if we reverse the arcs of X then the resulting
path is an (s, ti)-path in Gˆ(x) (which we call the ti-oriented version of πi).
The following lemma proves the existence of an alternating path tree, i.e., a
spanning tree of alternating paths, rooted at the common source node s. It is a
direct generalization of Lemma 4.6 in [11] and Lemma 4.5 in [15].
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Lemma 2. Let z and x be feasible flows and let Z and X be a partition of A as
in Definition 1. Then there exists an alternating path tree.
We now have all the ingredients to prove the following main result.
Theorem 3. Let x be θ-inducible and let z be 0-inducible. Further, let A = X∪Z
be a partition as in Definition 1. Let π be an alternating path tree, where πi
denotes the alternating s, ti-path in π.
(i) Suppose θ = (θmin, θmax). Let Xi be a flow-carrying path of commodity
i ∈ [k] maximizing lP (x) over all P ∈ Pi.
7 Then
C(x) ≤ C(z)+
∑
i∈[k]
ri
( ∑
a∈Z∩πi
θmaxa (za)−
∑
a∈X∩πi
θmina (za)−
∑
a∈Xi
θmina (xa)
)
.
(ii) Suppose θ = (α, β) with −1 < α ≤ 0 ≤ β. Let ηi is the number of disjoint
segments of consecutive arcs in Z on the alternating s, ti-path πi for i ∈
[k].8 Then
C(x)
C(z)
≤ 1 +
β − α
1 + α
·
∑
i∈[k]
riηi ≤ 1 +
β − α
1 + α
·
⌈
n− 1
2
⌉
· r.
Proof (i). We have C(x) =
∑
i
∑
P∈Pi
xiP lP (x) ≤
∑
i ri
∑
a∈Xi
la(xa) by the
choice of Xi. By applying the first inequality of Lemma 1 to the flow x in the
graph Gˆ(x), where we choose χ to be the ti-oriented version of πi, we obtain∑
a∈Xi
la(xa) + θ
min
a (xa) ≤
∑
a∈Z∩πi
la(xa) + θ
max
a (xa)−
∑
a∈X∩πi
la(xa) + θ
min
a (xa).
Let Zi be an arbitrary flow-carrying path of commodity i ∈ [k] with respect
to z. By applying the second inequality of Lemma 1 to the flow z in the graph
Gˆ(z) with θmax = θmin = 0, where we choose ψ to be the s-oriented version of
πi, we obtain ∑
a∈Zi
la(za) ≥
∑
a∈Z∩πi
la(za)−
∑
a∈X∩πi
la(za).
Combining these inequalities and exploiting the definition of X and Z, we obtain∑
a∈Xi
la(xa) + θ
min
a (xa) ≤
∑
a∈Z∩πi
la(xa) + θ
max
a (xa)−
∑
a∈X∩πi
la(xa) + θ
min
a (xa)
≤
∑
a∈Z∩πi
la(za) + θ
max
a (za)−
∑
a∈X∩πi
la(za) + θ
min
a (za)
≤
∑
a∈Zi
la(za) +
∑
a∈Z∩πi
θmaxa (za)−
∑
a∈X∩πi
θmina (za).
The claim now follows by multiplying the above inequality with ri and sum-
ming over all commodities i ∈ [k]. Note that C(z) =
∑
i ri
∑
a∈Zi
la(za). ⊓⊔
7 Note that the values lP (x)+ δP (x) are the same for all flow-carrying paths, but this
is not necessarily true for the values lP (x).
8 Note that ηi ≤ ⌈(n− 1)/2⌉.
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Fig. 1. The fifth Braess graph with (l5a, δ
5
a) on the arcs as defined in Example 1. The
bold arcs indicate the alternating path pi1.
4 Lower bounds for (α, β)-deviations
We show that the bound in Theorem 3 is tight in all its parameters for (α, β)-
deviations. We start with single-commodity instances.
Our instance is based on the generalized Braess graph [17]. The m-th Braess
graph Gm = (V m, Am) is defined by V m = {s, v1, . . . , vm−1, w1, . . . , wm−1, t}
and Am as the union of three sets: Em1 = {(s, vj), (vj , wj), (wj , t) : 1 ≤ j ≤
m− 1}, Em2 = {(vj , wj−1) : 2 ≤ j ≤ m} and E
m
3 = {(v1, t) ∪ {(s, wm−1}}.
Example 1. By Lemma 4 (see appendix), we can assume without loss of gen-
erality that α = 0. Let β ≥ 0 be a fixed constant and let n = 2m ≥ 4 ∈ N.9
Let Gm be the m-th Braess graph. Furthermore, let ym : R≥0 → R≥0 be a non-
decreasing, continuous function10 with ym(1/m) = 0 and ym(1/(m − 1)) = β.
We define
lma (g) =


(m− j) · ym(g) for a ∈ {(s, vj) : 1 ≤ j ≤ m− 1}
j · ym(g) for a ∈ {(wj , t) : 1 ≤ j ≤ m− 1}
1 otherwise.
Furthermore, we define δma (g) = β for a ∈ E
m
2 , and δ
m
a (g) = 0 otherwise. Note
that 0 ≤ δma (g) ≤ βl
m
a (g) for all a ∈ A and g ≥ 0 (see Figure 1 in the appendix).
A Nash flow z = f0 is given by routing 1/m units of flow over the paths
(s, wm−1, t), (s, v1, t) and the paths in {(s, vj , wj−1, t) : 2 ≤ j ≤ m−1}. Note that
all these paths have latency one, and the path (s, vj , wj , t), for some 1 ≤ m ≤ j,
also has latency one. We conclude that C(z) = 1.
9 Note that the value ⌈(n− 1)/2⌉ is the same for n ∈ {2m, 2m+ 1} with m ∈ N. The
example shows tightness for n = 2m. The tightness for n = 2m + 1 then follows
trivially by adding a dummy node.
10 For example ym(g) = m(m− 1)βmax{0,
(
g − 1
m
)
}. That is, we define ym to be zero
for 0 ≤ g ≤ 1/m and we let it increase with constant rate to β in 1/(m− 1).
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A Nash flow x = f δ, with δ as defined above, is given by routing 1/(m− 1)
units of flow over the paths in {(s, vj , wj , t) : 1 ≤ j ≤ m− 1}. Each such path P
then has a latency of lP (x) = 1+ βm. It follows that C(x) = 1+ βm. Note that
the deviated latency of path P is qP (x) = 1+βm because all deviations along this
path are zero. Each path P ′ = (s, vj , wj−1, t), for 2 ≤ j ≤ m− 1, has a deviated
latency of qP ′(x) = 1+β+(m− 1)ym(1/(m− 1)) = 1+β+(m− 1)β = 1+βm.
The same argument holds for the paths (s, wm−1, t) and (s, v1, t). We conclude
that x is δ-inducible. It follows that C(x)/C(z) = 1 + βm = 1 + βn/2. ⊓⊔
By adapting the construction above, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 4. There exist common source two-commodity instances I such that
DR(I, (α, β)) ≥
{
1 + (β − α)/(1 + α) · (n− 1)/2 · r for n = 2m+ 1 ∈ N≥5
1 + (β − α)/(1 + α) · [(n/2− 1)r + 1] for n = 2m ∈ N≥4.
For two-commodity instances and n even, we can actually improve the upper
bound in Theorem 3 to the lower bound stated in Theorem 4 (see Remark 2 in
the appendix).
For general multi-commodity instances the situation is much worse. In par-
ticular, we establish an exponential lower bound on the Deviation Ratio. The
instance used in proof of Theorem 5 is similar to the one used by Lin et al. [11].
Theorem 5. For every p = 2q+1 ∈ N, there exists a two-commodity instance I
whose size is polynomially bounded in p such that DR(I, (α, β)) ≥ 1 + βFp+1 ≈
1 + 0.45β · φp+1, where Fp is the p-th Fibonacci number and φ ≈ 1.618 is the
golden ratio.
5 Applications
By using our bounds on the Deviation Ratio, we obtain the following results.
Price of Risk Aversion.
Theorem 6. The Price of Risk Aversion for a common source multi-commodity
instance I with non-negative and non-decreasing latency functions, variance-to-
mean-ratio κ > 0 and risk-aversion parameter γ ≥ −1/κ is at most
PRA(I, γ, κ) ≤
{
1− γκ/(1 + γκ)⌈(n− 1)/2⌉r for −1/κ < γ ≤ 0
1 + γκ⌈(n− 1)/2⌉r for γ ≥ 0.
Moreover, these bounds are tight in all its parameters if n = 2m+ 1 and almost
tight if n = 2m (see appendix for precise statements). In particular, for single-
commodity instances we obtain tightness for all n ∈ N.
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Stability of Nash flows under small perturbations.
Theorem 7. Let I be a common source multi-commodity instance with non-
negative and non-decreasing latency functions (la)a∈A. Let f be a Nash flow
with respect to (la)a∈A and let f˜ be a Nash flow with respect to slightly perturbed
latency functions (l˜a)a∈A satisfying supa∈A, x≥0 |(la(x) − l˜a(x))/la(x)| ≤ ǫ for
some small ǫ > 0. Then the relative error in social cost is (C(f˜ )−C(f))/C(f) ≤
2ǫ/(1− ǫ)⌈(n− 1)/2⌉ · r = O(ǫrn).
6 Smoothness based approaches
We derive tight smoothness bounds on the Biased Price of Anarchy for (0, β)-
deviations. Our bounds improve upon the bounds of (1 + β)/(1 − µ) recently
obtained by Meir and Parkes [12] and Lineas et al. [10] for (1, µ)-smooth latency
functions. As a direct consequence, we also obtain better smoothness bounds on
the Price of Risk Aversion. Our approach is a generalization of the framework
of Correa, Schulz and Stier-Moses [7] (which we obtain for β = 0).
Let L be a given set of latency functions and β ≥ 0 fixed. For l ∈ L, define
µˆ(l, β) = sup
x,z≥0
{
z[l(x)− (1 + β)l(z)]
xl(x)
}
and µˆ(L, β) = sup
l∈L
µˆ(L, β).
Theorem 8. Let L be a set of non-negative, non-decreasing and continuous
functions. Let I be a general multi-commodity instance with (la)a∈A ∈ L
A. Let
x be δ-inducible for some (0, β)-deviation δ and let z be an arbitrary feasible
flow. Then C(x)/C(z) ≤ (1 + β)/(1 − µˆ(L, β)) if µˆ(L, β) < 1. Moreover, this
bound is tight if L contains all constant functions and is closed under scalar
multiplication, i.e., for every l ∈ L and γ ≥ 0, γl ∈ L.
For example, for affine latencies µˆ(L, β) = 1/(4(1+ β)) (see Proposition 3 in
the appendix) and we obtain a bound of (1+β)2/(34 +β) on the Biased Price of
Anarchy, which is strictly better than the bound 4(1+ β)/3 obtained in [10,12].
We also provide an upper bound on the absolute gap between the Biased
Price of Anarchy and the Deviation Ratio (see Corollary 1 in the appendix).
As a final result we derive smoothness bounds for general path deviations, which
are not necessarily decomposable into arc deviations. The main motivation for
investigating such deviations is that we can apply such bounds to the mean-
std objective of the Price of Risk Aversion model by Nikolova and Stier-Moses
[15] (see Section 2). We need to adjust some definitions of Section 2. We are
given non-positive and non-negative, respectively, continuous threshold functions
θmin =
(
θminP
)
P∈P
and θmax = (θmaxP )P∈P and consider deviations (δP )P∈P from
∆(θ) = {(δP )P∈P : θ
min
P (f) ≤ δP (f) ≤ θ
max
P (f) for all feasible flows f}.
Now (α, β)-deviations are deviations δ ∈ ∆(θ) with θminP = αlP and θ
max
P = βlP
for all P ∈ P .
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Let f be δ-inducible with respect to some (α, β)-deviation δ. The Nash flow
conditions (1) then imply that ∀i ∈ [k], ∀P ∈ Pi, fP > 0:
(1 + α)lP (f) ≤ lP (f) + δP (f) ≤ lP ′(f) + δP ′(f) ≤ (1 + β)lP ′(f) ∀P
′ ∈ Pi.
In particular, the above inequality reveals that f is an (1+β)/(1+α)-approximate
Nash flow (see [5]). As a consequence, the bounds by Christodoulou et al. [5], on
the Price of Anarchy for approximate Nash flows in non-atomic routing games
with polynomial latency functions, yield upper bounds on the BPoA and DR of
instances with polynomial latency functions.
Theorem 9. Let I be a general multi-commodity instance with (la)a∈A ∈ L
A.
Let x be δ-inducible with respect to some (0, β)-path deviation δ and let z an
arbitrary feasible flow. If µˆ(L, 0) < 1/(1 + β), then C(x)/C(z) ≤ (1 + β)/(1 −
(1 + β)µˆ(L, 0)).
7 Conclusions
We introduced a unifying model to study the impact of (bounded) worst-case
latency deviations in non-atomic selfish routing games. We demonstrated that
the Deviation Ratio is a useful measure to assess the cost deterioration caused
by such deviations. Among potentially other applications, we showed that the
Deviation Ratio provides bounds on the Price of Risk Aversion and the relative
error in social cost if the latency functions are subject to small perturbations.
Our approach to bound the Deviation Ratio (see Section 3) is quite generic
and, albeit considering a rather general setting, enables us to obtain tight
bounds. We believe that this approach will turn out to be useful to derive bounds
on the Deviation Ratio of other games (e.g., network cost sharing games).
A natural extension of the bounded deviation model introduced in Section
2 is to consider heterogeneous players, i.e., players have different attitudes to-
wards the deviations. Below we briefly report on some preliminary results for
single-commodity networks. These extensions also hold for the framework of
path deviations as described in the previous section.
In general, studying the impact of (bounded) worst-case deviations of the
input data of more general classes of games (e.g., congestion games) is an inter-
esting and challenging direction for future work.
Preliminary results for single-commodity networks and heterogenous players. We
consider k different player types in a single-commodity network (i.e., all player
types share the same source and destination). For each type i ∈ [k] we have a
demand ri and an attitude τi towards the deviations. We assume without loss of
generality that the demands are normalized such that
∑
i∈[k] ri = 1. A feasible
flow f = (f iP )i∈[k],P∈P is δ-inducible if:
∀i ∈ [k], ∀P ∈ P , f iP > 0 : lP (f) + τiδP (f) ≤ lP ′(f) + τiδP ′(f) ∀P
′ ∈ P .
We prove the following result:
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Lemma 3. Let I be a single-commodity instance and let z be a 0-inducible Nash
flow. Let x be a δ-inducible Nash flow for some (0, β)-path deviation δ. If there
is an alternating (s, t)-path π consisting only of arcs in Z, then
C(x)
C(z)
≤ 1 + β
(∑
i∈[k]
τiri
)
.
Note that the condition of the alternating path π to consist of arcs in Z only
is equivalent to having η = 1, i.e., π is an actual (s, t)-path in the underlying
graph. In particular, this condition is satisfied for series-parallel graphs (see,
e.g., Corollary 4.8 [15]). This implies that the bound derived above holds for all
instances with series-parallel graphs. It would be interesting to see if this bound
extends to arbitrary alternating paths.
Proof (Lemma 3). For i ∈ [k], let P¯i be a path maximizing lP (x) over all flow-
carrying paths P ∈ P of type i. We have (this argument is also used in the proof
of Lemma 4 in [10]):
lP¯i(x) ≤ lP¯i(x)+τiδP¯i(x) ≤ lπ(x)+τiδπ(x) ≤ (1+βτi)lπ(x) = (1+βτi)
∑
a∈π
la(xa).
Note that, by definition of the alternating path π, we have xa ≤ za for all a ∈ π.
Continuing with the estimate, we find lP¯i(x) ≤ (1 + βτi)
∑
a∈π la(za) and thus
C(x) ≤
∑
i∈[k]
rilP¯i(x) ≤
∑
i∈[k]
ri(1 + βτi)
∑
a∈π
la(za) = C(z)
(∑
i∈[k]
ri(1 + βτi)
)
Since
∑
i∈[k] ri = 1, we get the desired result. Note that we use C(z) =∑
a∈π la(za), which is true because there exists a flow-decomposition of z in
which π is flow-carrying (here we use za > 0 for all a ∈ π). ⊓⊔
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A Omitted material of Section 2
Theorem 1. Given an instance I, threshold functions θ and a parameter K, it
is NP-complete to determine whether there exist deviations δ ∈ ∆(θ) such that
C(f δ) ≥ K, even for single-commodity networks with linear latencies.
Proof. We give a reduction from the Directed Hamiltonian s, t-Path prob-
lem: We are given a directed graph G = (V,A), and fixed s, t ∈ V , and the goal
is to decide whether or not there exists a simple directed s, t-path in G that vis-
its every node exactly once. Let J be an instance of Directed Hamiltonian
s, t-Path problem.
Now, define an instance I of the bounded deviation model on the graph G
by taking la(x) = x for all a ∈ A, θ
min
a = 0 for all a ∈ A, and θ
max
a = n− 1 for
all a ∈ A. Furthermore, take r = 1.
We claim that G has a Hamiltonian path from s to t if and only if there is
a deviation δ ∈ ∆(θ) such that C(f δ) ≥ n− 1. First, let G have a Hamiltonian
path P from s to t, and define δ by δa = 0 if a ∈ P , and δa = n− 1 otherwise.
We then have that f δ is given by f δa = 1 if a ∈ P and fa = 0 otherwise, since
the perceived latency along P is then equal to lP (f) = n − 1, and any other
path P ′ uses at least one different arc a′ /∈ P , which gives us that QP ′(f) ≥
la′(f) + δa′(f) ≥ n − 1 = QP (f). Note that f
δ is the unique Nash flow in this
case (since all the perceived latencies la + δa are strictly increasing).
Conversely, suppose there is a δ ∈ ∆(θ) such that C(f δ) ≥ n − 1. For any
feasible flow g we have that lP (g) ≤ n− 1, with strict inequality if fP < 1 (since
then there will be at least one arc a ∈ P with fa < 1). This means that
C(g) =
∑
P∈P
gP lP (g) ≤
∑
P∈P
gP (n− 1) = n− 1,
using that r = 1. Again, we have strict inequality if 0 < gP < 1 for some path
P , i.e., if not all players use the same path. This means that for f δ there is at
most one path P ∗ with f δP∗ > 0, which then implies that fP∗ = 1. Furthermore,
we can conclude that |A(P ∗)| = lP∗(f
δ) = C(f δ) = n−1, which implies that P ∗
is a Hamiltonian path from s to t, since it is a simple path by assumption. ⊓⊔
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B Omitted material of Section 3
B.1 Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2. Let f be a feasible flow. Then f is θ-inducible if and only if Gˆ(f)
does not contain a cycle of negative cost with respect to c.
Proof. Suppose that f is an inducible flow and let δ be a vector of deviations
that induce f . Let Bˆ be a directed cycle in Gˆ(f). If Bˆ only consists of forward
arcs, then
∑
a∈Bˆ(la + θ
max
a ) ≥
∑
a∈Bˆ(la + θ
min
a ) ≥ 0, where the last inequality
holds because of Assumption 1.
Next, suppose that there is a reversed arc a = (v, u) ∈ Bˆ ∩ A¯. Then (u, v) ∈
A+i for some commodity i ∈ [k]. Let B = (b1, . . . , bq, b1) be the cycle that we
obtain from Bˆ if all arcs (v, u) ∈ Bˆ ∩ A¯ are replaced by a = (u, v) ∈ A+ (note
that B is contained in G and that it is not a directed cycle). For every arc
b = (bl, bl+1) ∈ B ∩ A
+, there is a flow-carrying path Pl
11 from s to bl for some
commodity i (here we use the fact that all commodities share the same source).
Intuitively, the proof is as follows. For all nodes b ∈ V (B) with two incoming
arcs of B, we can can find two paths Q1 and Q2 leading to that node, using the
paths Pl and the cycle B (see also Figure 2). Furthermore, one of those paths
is flow-carrying by construction. We then apply the Nash conditions to those
flow-carrying paths (exploiting the common source) and add up the resulting
inequalities. The contributions of the paths Pl cancel out in the aggregated
inequality, leading to the desired result. We now give a formal proof of this
sketch.
s b1
b2 b3
b4
b5b6
P4
P1
P6
Fig. 2. The dashed arcs are the reversed arcs in Gˆ. The black bold arcs indicate the
cycle B. We have (h0, h1, h2, h3) = (1, 4, 6, 1). Note that, for example, it could be the
case that P1 = P6 ∪ (b6, b1).
11 Note that the paths Pl can overlap, use parts of B, or even be subpaths of each
other.
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Without loss of generality, we may assume that (b1, b2) ∈ A
+. Let h1 ∈
{2, . . . , q + 1} be the smallest index for which (bh1 , bh1+1) ∈ A
+ (here we
take bq+1 := b1 and Pq+1 := P1). Note that the concatenation of Ph1 and
(bh1 , bh1−1, . . . , b2) is a directed path from s to b2. Then we have
l(b1,b2) + δ(b1,b2) +
∑
a∈P1
(la + δa) ≤
h1∑
j=3
l(bj,bj−1) + δ(bj ,bj−1) +
∑
a∈Ph1
(la + δa)
by using the fact that a subpath (s, . . . , u) of a shortest (s, ti)-path
(s, . . . , u, . . . , ti) is a shortest (s, u)-path if G does not contain negative cost
cycles under the cost function l + δ (which is true because of Property 1). We
can now repeat this procedure by letting h2 ∈ {h1+1, . . . , q+1} be the smallest
index for which (bh2 , bh2+1) ∈ A
+, then we have
l(bh1 ,bh1+1)+δ(bh1 ,bh1+1)+
∑
a∈Ph1
(la+δa) ≤
h2∑
j=h1+2
l(bj ,bj−1)+δ(bj,bj−1)+
∑
a∈Ph2
(la+δa).
Continuing this procedure, we find a sequence 1 = h0 < h1 < · · · < hp = q + 1
such that, for every 0 ≤ w ≤ p− 1,
l(bhw ,bhw+1)+δ(bhw ,bhw+1)+
∑
a∈Phw
la+δa ≤
hw+1∑
j=hw+2
l(bj ,bj−1)+δ(bj ,bj−1)+
∑
a∈Phw+1
la+δa.
(3)
Note that p is the number of reversed arcs on the cycle Bˆ.
Summing up these inequalities for 0 ≤ w ≤ p− 1, we obtain∑
(v,u)∈Bˆ∩A¯
l(u,v) + δ(u,v) ≤
∑
a∈Bˆ∩A
la + δa,
since all the contributions of the path Pl cancel out. Now using the definition of
a θ-deviation, we find∑
a∈Bˆ∩A
(la+θ
max
a )−
∑
(v,u)∈Bˆ∩A¯
(l(u,v)+θ
min
(u,v)) ≥
∑
a∈Bˆ∩A
(la+δa)−
∑
(v,u)∈Bˆ∩A¯
(l(u,v)+δ(u,v)) ≥ 0.
We have shown that Bˆ has non-negative cost. Note that Bˆ as zero cost if all the
arcs on the cycle are reversed.
For the other direction of the proof, consider the set F(θ) of θ-deviations δ ∈
∆(θ) that induce f = (f ia)i∈[k],a∈A (see also [11, 17]):
F(θ) = {(δa)a∈A
∣∣ πi,v − πi,u ≤ la(fa) + δa(fa) ∀a = (u, v) ∈ A, ∀i ∈ [k]
πi,v − πi,u = la(fa) + δa(fa) ∀a = (u, v) ∈ A
+
i , ∀i ∈ [k]
θmina (fa) ≤ δa(fa) ≤ θ
max
a (fa) ∀a ∈ A}. (4)
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That is, f is θ-inducible if and only if (4) has a feasible solution. Now suppose
that Gˆ(f) does not contain a cycle of negative cost. Then we can determine the
shortest path distance δu from s to every node u ∈ V . We define πi,u := πu
for all u ∈ V and i ∈ [k]. Furthermore, for a = (u, v) ∈ A, we define δa :=
max{θmina , πv − πu − la}. We will now show that δ induces f by showing that
we have constructed a feasible solution for (4). First of all, for all i ∈ [k] and
a ∈ A\A+i , we have δa ≥ πv−πu− la, which is equivalent to πi,v−πi,u ≤ la+δa.
Secondly, if a = (u, v) ∈ A+i , then πu − πv ≤ −la − θ
min
a (which we derive using
the reversed arc (v, u)). But this is equivalent to πi,v − πi,u − la ≥ θ
min
a . We
can conclude that δa = πi,v − πi,u − la. Furthermore, we clearly have δa ≥ θ
min
a .
Lastly, for all a = (u, v) ∈ A we have πv − πu ≤ la + θ
max
a which is equivalent to
πv − πu − la ≤ θ
max
a . Combining this with the trivial inequality θ
min
a ≤ θ
max
a we
can conclude that δa ≤ θ
max
a . This completes the proof. ⊓⊔
Remark 1. Consider the graph G = (V,A) in Figure 3 and suppose that
r1 = r2 = 1. Then the flow f that routes one unit of flow over both paths
(s1, v1, 1, 2, t1) and (s2, v2, 3, 4, t2) is feasible and inducible (take δ = 0). How-
ever, looking at the graph Gˆ(f), we see the negative cost cycle (1, 4, 3, 2, 1) (by
using the reversed arcs of (1, 2) and (3, 4)). ⊓⊔
s1 v1 1 2 t1
t2 4 3 v2 s2
la = 1
la = 3
θmaxa = 2 θ
max
a = 1
Fig. 3. All the values of la, θ
min
a and θ
max
a that are not explicitly stated are zero.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1. Let x be θ-inducible and let Xi be a flow-carrying (s, ti)-path for
commodity i ∈ [k] in G. Let χ and ψ be any (s, ti)-path and (ti, s)-path in Gˆ(x),
respectively. Then∑
a∈Xi
la(xa) + θ
min
a (xa) ≤
∑
a∈χ∩A
la(xa) + θ
max
a (xa)−
∑
a∈χ∩A¯
la(xa) + θ
min
a (xa)
∑
a∈Xi
la(xa) + θ
max
a (xa) ≥
∑
a∈ψ∩A¯
la(xa) + θ
min
a (xa)−
∑
a∈ψ∩A
la(xa) + θ
max
a (xa).
We need the following proposition to prove Lemma 1.
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Proposition 1. Let G = (V,A) be a non-empty, directed multigraph with the
property that δ−(v) = δ+(v) for all v ∈ V . Then G is the union of arc-
disjoint directed (simple) cycles C1, . . . , Cj, such that
⋃
j′ V (Cj′ ) = V (C) and⋃
j′ A(Cj′ ) = A(C).
Proof. If G is non-empty then it is clear that we can always find a (simple)
directed cycle C in G. Removing the arcs of this cycle leads to the graph G\C :=
(V,A \ A(C)) that also satisfies δ−(v) = δ+(v) for all v ∈ V (note that if there
are multiple arcs between two nodes, we only remove the copy on the cycle). ⊓⊔
Proof (Lemma 1). Since Xi is a flow-carrying path, we know that for every
a = (u, v) ∈ Xi, we have a reversed arc (v, u) ∈ Aˆ in Gˆ. Furthermore, any
(s, ti)-path in Gˆ can consist of both forward as well as reversed arcs. Let Hˆ be
the graph consisting of the reversed path of Xi (say X
′
i), and the path χ, where
we add a copy of an arc if it is used by both paths (i.e., Hˆ can be a multigraph).
Note that Hˆ satisfies the conditions of Proposition 1, since it is the union of an
(s, ti)-path and a (ti, s)-path. Therefore, the graph Hˆ is the union of arc-disjoint
directed cycles C1, . . . , Cj for some j. Now, we apply Theorem 2 to all these
cycles and obtain∑
a∈A∩Cj′
(la(xa) + θ
max
a )(xa)−
∑
a∈A¯∩Cj′
(la(xa) + θ
min
a )(xa) ≥ 0
for all j′ = 1, . . . , j. Adding up these inequalities then gives the desired result.
The second inequality can be proved similarly (by applying the first argument
in the opposite direction of the cycle). ⊓⊔
B.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Lemma 2. Let z and x be feasible flows and let Z and X be a partition of A as
in Definition 1. Then there exists an alternating path tree.
Proof. Let G′ = (V ′, A′) be the graph defined by V = V ∪ {t} and A′ = A ∪
{(ti, t) : i ∈ [k]}. Let x
′, z′ be the flows defined by
x′a =
{
xa for a = (u, v) ∈ A
ri for a = (ti, t) with i ∈ [k]
and z′a =
{
za for a = (u, v) ∈ A
ri for a = (ti, t) with i ∈ [k]
Then x′ and z′ are feasible (s, t)-flows in G′. We can write A = Z ′ ∪ X ′ with
Z ′ = Z ∪ {(ti, t) : i ∈ [k]} and X
′ having the same properties as Z and X in G
(which follows from x′a = z
′
a = ri > 0 for all a = (ti, t)).
We can now apply the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 4.5 in [15] of
which we will give a short summary (for sake of completeness). For any s-t cut
defined by S ∪ V ′ with s ∈ S we claim that we can cross S with an arc in Z ′, or
a reversed arc in X ′. Suppose that this would not be the case, i.e., all arcs into
S are in the set Z ′ and all the outgoing arcs of S are in X ′. Let xZ′ and zZ′ be
the total incoming flows from S, and xX′ and zX′ the total outgoing flows from
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S (for resp. flows x and z). From the definition of Z ′ it follows that xZ′ ≤ zZ′ .
From conservation of flow it follows that xX′ − xZ′ = zX′ − zZ′ . Combining
these two observations, we find that xX′ ≤ zX′ . However, by definition of X
′,
we have xX′ > zX′ (since we removed all arcs a with za = xa = 0). We find a
contradiction.
Having proved the claim that we can always cross with an arc in Z ′ or a
reversed arc in X ′, we can now easily construct a spanning tree π′ consisting of
alternating paths, by starting with the cut (S,G \ S) given by S = {s}.
Note that t cannot be an interior point of π′, since t is only adjacent to
incoming arcs of the set Z ′. This means that if we remove (tj , t) from π
′ (where
j is the index for which (tj , t) is in the tree π
′), we have found an alternating
path tree π for the graph G, under the flows x and z. ⊓⊔
B.4 Proof of Theorem 3(ii)
We need the following lemma and proposition for the proof of Theorem 3(ii).
Lemma 4. Let −1 < α ≤ 0 ≤ β be fixed. Then f is inducible with an (α, β)-
deviation if and only if it is inducible with a (0, β−α1+α )-deviation.
Proof. Let f be inducible for some αl ≤ δ ≤ βl, and for a ∈ A, write δa(fa) =
dala(fa). Without loss of generality we may assume that δa(x) = dala(x) (since
by definition dala(x) also induces f). From the equilibrium conditions, we know
that
∀i ∈ [k], ∀P ∈ Pi, f
δ
P > 0 :
∑
a∈P
la(fa)+δa(fa) ≤
∑
a∈P ′
la(fa)+δa(fa) ∀P
′ ∈ Pi.
This is equivalent to ∀i ∈ [k], ∀P ∈ Pi, f
δ
P > 0 :∑
a∈P
(
1 +
da − α
1 + α
)
la(fa) ≤
∑
a∈P ′
(
1 +
da − α
1 + α
)
la(fa) ∀P
′ ∈ Pi
which can be seen by writing
la(fa) + δa(fa) = (1 + da)la(fa) = (1 + α+ da − α)la(fa),
and then dividing the inequality by 1 + α. We then see that δ′, defined by
δ′a(x) =
da−α
1+α la(x) for all a ∈ A and x ≥ 0, also induces f , since
αla(x) ≤ dala(x) ≤ βla(x) ⇔ 0 ≤
da − α
1 + α
la(x) ≤
β − α
1 + α
la(x).
⊓⊔
Proposition 2. Let z = f0 be a Nash flow for a multi-commodity instance with
a common source. Let v ∈ V and let i, j ∈ [k] be two commodities for which
there exist flow-carrying (s, v)-paths P1 ∈ Pi and P2 ∈ Pj, respectively. Then
there exists a feasible Nash flow z¯ with z¯a = za for all a ∈ A such that both paths
P1, P2 are flow-carrying for commodity i, and both paths P1, P2 are flow-carrying
for commodity j, i.e., we have z¯iP1 , z¯
i
P2
, z¯jP1 , z¯
j
P2
> 0.
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Proof. Intuitively, we shift an ǫ amount of flow of commodity i to path P2 and
an ǫ amount of flow of commodity j to path P1. Formally, choose ǫ > 0 small
enough such that ziP1 − ǫ, z
j
P2
− ǫ > 0. We define
z¯lP =


ziP1 − ǫ if P = P1 and l = i
zjP1 + ǫ if P = P1 and l = j
ziP2 + ǫ if P = P2 and l = i
zjP2 − ǫ if P = P2 and l = j
and let all the other flow-carrying paths remain unchanged. It then immediately
follows that za = z¯a for all a ∈ A, and in the resulting feasible flow z¯, both
commodities i and j are flow-carrying for both paths P1 and P2. The feasibility
of z¯ follows because both commodities have the same source. Moreover, the
common source also implies that if z is a Nash flow, then z¯ is also a Nash flow
(since commodity i implies that lP1(z) ≤ lP2(z), and commodity j implies that
lP2(z) ≤ lP1(z)). ⊓⊔
Proof (Theorem 3(ii)). By Lemma 4 we can assume without loss of generality
that θmaxa =
β−α
1+α la and θ
min
a = 0 for all a ∈ A. Furthermore, with Aij we denote
the j-th segment of πi, j = 1, . . . , ηi, consisting of consecutive arcs in Z. Using
Theorem 3 and the definition of Aij , we obtain
C(x) ≤ C(z) +
β − α
1 + α
∑
i∈[k]
ri
∑
a∈P∩πi
la(za)
≤ C(z) +
β − α
1 + α
∑
i∈[k]
ri

ηi · max
j=1,...,ηi
∑
a∈Aij
la(za)


Note that it now suffices to show that
∑
a∈Aij
la(za) ≤ C(z) for all j = 1, . . . , ηi
and i ∈ [k].
We prove below that, for a fixed section Aij , there exists a commodity w ∈ [k]
such that every a ∈ Aij is flow-carrying for commodity w (note that w and i
can be different). This allows us to assume that Aij is contained in some flow-
carrying path lw ∈ Pw (by choosing a suitable path decomposition of z for
commodity w). We then obtain that
∑
a∈Aij
la(za) ≤ lw(z) ≤ C(z) since ri ≥ 1.
Recall that C(z) =
∑
i∈[k] rilZi(z), where Zi ∈ Pi is an arbitrary flow-carrying
path for commodity i ∈ [k].
We will now prove the above claim. Fix a section Aij and let a1 = (u, v) and
a2 = (v, w) be two consecutive arcs that are flow-carrying for commodities w1
and w2 in z, respectively. This implies that there are flow-carrying (s, v)-paths
W1 and W2 such that W1 is flow-carrying for w1, and W2 for w2. The existence
of W1 is clear, and the existence of W2 follows from flow-conservation applied to
commodity w2 (since flow is leaving node v for that commodity). But then, by
Proposition 2, we may assume that a1 is also flow-carrying for commodity w2.
Applying this argument repeatedly, starting with the last two arcs on Aij and
working to the front, we can show that the whole section Aij is flow-carrying for
a commodity that is flow-carrying on the last arc of Aij . ⊓⊔
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C Omitted material of Section 4
C.1 Proof of Theorem 4
Theorem 4. There exist common source two-commodity instances I such that
DR(I, (α, β)) ≥
{
1 + (β − α)/(1 + α) · (n− 1)/2 · r for n = 2m+ 1 ∈ N≥5
1 + (β − α)/(1 + α) · [(n/2− 1)r + 1] for n = 2m ∈ N≥4.
Proof. We first prove the claim for n odd. Let r ∈ R≥1 and n = 2m+ 1 ∈ N≥5.
We modify the graph Gm by adding one extra node t2 (the node t will be referred
to as t1 from here on). We add the arcs (s, t2) and (t2, t1) (see the dotted arcs in
Figure 1). We take one commodity with sink t1 and r1 = 1, and one commodity
with sink t2 and demand r2 = r − 1. Note that the latter commodity only has
one (s, t2)-path.
The pairs (lma (g), δ
m
a (g)), for all a except (s, t2) and (t2, t1), are defined as
in Example 1, but with y a non-decreasing, non-negative, continuous function
satisfying ym(1/m) = 0 and ym((1 − ǫm)/(m − 1)) = β, where we choose
0 < ǫm < 1/m so that 1/m < (1 − ǫm)/(m − 1). For a = (s, t2), we take
(lma (g), δ
m
a (g)) = (y
∗
m(x
′), 0), where y∗ is a non-decreasing, non-negative, contin-
uous function satisfying y∗m(r − 1) = 0 and y
∗
m(r − 1 + ǫm) = β. For a = (t2, t1)
we take (lma (g), δ
m
a (g)) = (1, 0). See Figure 4 for an example.
s v3
v4
v2
v1
w4
w3
w2
w1
t1
t2
(1,
β)
(ym
(x)
, 0)
(2ym(x), 0)
(3ym(x), 0)
(4y
m (x), 0)
(1
, 0
)
(1, β)
(1,
0)
(1, β)
(1,
0)
(1, β)
(1,
0)
(4y
m(x), 0)
(3ym(x), 0)
(2ym(x), 0)
(ym
(x)
, 0)
(1,
β)
(5y ∗
m (x), 0) (
1,
0)
Fig. 4. The fifth (odd) Braess graph with (l5a, δ
5
a) on the arcs as defined above, where
t = t1. The thick edges indicate the alternating path pi1.
A Nash flow z for this instance is given by routing 1/m units of flow over
the paths (s, wm−1, t1), (s, v1, t1) and the paths in {(s, vj , wj−1, t1) : 2 ≤ j ≤
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m− 1} for the first commodity, and r− 1 units of flow over (s, t2) for the second
commodity. This claim is true since all the paths for the first commodity have
latency one, as well as the paths (s, vj , wj , t), for 1 ≤ m ≤ j. This is also true for
(s, t2, t1). The latency for the other commodity is zero. We may conclude that
C(z) = 1.
A Nash flow x under deviation δ, as defined here, is given by, for the first
commodity, routing (1−ǫm)/(m−1) units of flow over the paths in {(s, vj , wj , t) :
1 ≤ j ≤ m − 1}, and ǫm units of flow over the path (s, t2, t1). Note that the
perceived latency on all these paths p is qP (x) = 1 + βm (which is also the true
latency, since all the deviations are zero on the arcs of these paths). Using the
same reasoning as in Example 1 it can be seen that the perceived latency on
the paths P ′ = (s, vj , wj−1, t), for 2 ≤ j ≤ m − 1, is also qP ′(x) = 1 + βm,
from which we may conclude that x is indeed a Nash flow under the deviation
δ. We haveC(x) = 1+βm+(r− 1)βm = 1+βrm, since for the first commodity
the (true) latency along every path is 1 + βm, and for the other commodity the
latency along (s, t2) is βm.
We next prove the claim for n even. Let r ∈ R≥1 and n = 2m ∈ N≥4. We use
the same Braess graphs as in Example 1, without modifications. We introduce
another commodity with demand r2 = r − 1, for which we choose t2 = v1. We
replace the pair ((m − 1)ym(x
′), 0) on a = (s, v1) by the pair ((m − 1)y
′
m(g), 0)
where y′m satisfies y
′
m(1/m+r−1) = 0 and y
′
m(1/(m−1)+r−1) = β. Note that
the flows x and z, as defined in Example 1 with the extension that the second
commodity uses the arc (s, v1) in both cases, still form feasible Nash flows for
their respective deviations. We obtain
C(x) =
∑
i
∑
q∈Pi
xiqlq(x) = 1 + βm+ (r − 1)(m− 1)β
= 1 + βm+ β(r − 1)(m− 1) = (1 + βrm) − β(r − 1).
⊓⊔
Remark 2. For two-commodity instances with n even, we can actually improve
the upper bound in Theorem 3 to the lower bound stated in Theorem 4: Suppose
the upper bound of Theorem 3 is tight. Then we need to have η1 = η2 = n/2.
This means that the alternating path tree is actually a path (in the sense that
all nodes are adjacent to at most two arcs of the alternating path tree) that
alternates between arcs in X and Z, starting and ending with an arc in Z (see
Figure 1). However, because t1 6= t2 this means that at least one of the two
commodities has no more than n/2− 1 arcs in Z, which is a contradiction.
C.2 Proof of Theorem 5
Theorem 5. For every p = 2q+1 ∈ N, there exists a two-commodity instance I
whose size is polynomially bounded in p such that DR(I, (α, β)) ≥ 1 + βFp+1 ≈
1 + 0.45β · φp+1, where Fp is the p-th Fibonacci number and φ ≈ 1.618 is the
golden ratio.
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Fig. 5. The graph Gp for p = 7 (this is a reproduction of (Fig. 4, [11])). The arc
a = (s1, e) has δa = β, whereas all the other arcs have δa = 0.
Our proof of Theorem 5 is based on the following graph, which was used by
Lin et al. [11].
Definition 2 ([11]). For p = 2q + 1 ∈ N, the graph Gp = (V p, Ap) is defined
by
V p = {s1, s2, t1, t2, e, w0, . . . , wp, v1, . . . , vp},
and Ap = A(P p1 ) ∪ A(P
p
2 ) ∪ A
p
1 ∪ A
p
2 ∪ {s1, w0} where
P p1 = (s1, e, w1, v1, v2, . . . , vp, t1) and P
p
2 = (s2, w0, w1, . . . , w7, t2)
are the horizontal (s1, t1)-path and vertical (s2, t2)-path, respectively; see Figure
5. Further,
Ap1 = {(s2, vi) : i = 1, 3, 5, 7, . . . , p− 2} ∪ {(e, wi) : i = 2, 4, 6, 8, . . . , p− 1}
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and
Ap2 = {(wi, vi) : i = 3, 5, 7, . . . , p} ∪ {(vi, wi) : i = 2, 4, 6, 8, . . . , p− 1}.
Lastly, the paths Ti are denoted by
Ti =


(s1, w0, w1, v1, . . . , vp, t1) i = 0
(s1, e, wi, wi+1, vi+1, . . . , vp, t1) i = 2, 4, 6, . . . , p− 1
(s2, v1, vi+1, wi+1, . . . , wp, t2) i = 1, 3, 5, . . . , p
These paths can be seen as ‘shortcuts’ for the paths P1 and P2. ⊓⊔
Proof (Theorem 5). We consider instances (Gp, lp, δp, rp)p=1,3,5,7,... with G
p as in
Definition 2. It is not hard to see that |V p|, |Ap| ∈ O(p). The latency functions
lp are given as follows:
lpa(x
′) =


βgiδ(x
′) for a ∈ {(vi, vi+1) : i = 1, 3, 5, . . . , p− 2}
βgiδ(x
′) for a ∈ {(wi, wi+1) : i = 0, 2, 4, 6, . . . , p− 1}
1 for a ∈ {(s1, e), (s1, w0)}
0 otherwise.
Here
giδ(x
′) =


0 x′ ≤ 1
hiδ(x
′) 1 ≤ x′ ≤ 1 + δ
Fi x
′ ≥ 1 + δ,
where Fi is the i-th Fibonacci number, and h
i
δ(x
′) is some non-decreasing, non-
negative, continuous function satisfying hiδ(1) = 0 and h
i
δ(1 + δ) = Fi (so that
giδ(x
′) is also non-decreasing, non-negative and continuous). Furthermore, we
take δa = β for a = (s1, e) and δa = 0 for all a ∈ A \ {(s1, e)}. Finally, we have
rp1 = r
p
2 = 1.
Let z be the defined by sending one unit of flow over the paths P1 and P2.
We claim that z is a Nash flow with respect to the latencies lp and C(z) = 1. By
construction, the latency along the path P1 is lP1(z) = 1. It is not hard to see
that any (s1, t1)-path has latency greater or equal than one (because every path
for commodity 1 uses either (s1, e) or (s1, w0)). For commodity 2 the latency
along P2 is lP2(z) = 0, which is clearly a shortest path. This proves that z is a
Nash flow. Further, C(z) = 1.
We use Lemma 5 (given below) to describe a Nash flow x with respect to the
deviated latencies lp+δp. It follows that C(x) = C(x)/C(z) ≥ 1+βFp−1+βFp =
1 + βFp+1. This concludes the proof (since Fp ≈ c · φ
p where c ≈ 0.4472 and
φ ≈ 1.618). ⊓⊔
The following lemma is similar to Lemma 5.4, Lemma 5.5 and Lemma 5.6
in [11]).
Lemma 5. There exists a δ > 0 and a feasible flow x satisfying the following
properties:
26
(i) xa ≥ 1 + δ for all a ∈ {(vi, vi+1) : i = 1, 3, 5, . . . , p− 2} ∪ {(wi, wi+1) : i =
0, 2, 4, 6, . . . , p− 1}.
(ii) lP (x) ≥ 1 + βFp−1 for all P ∈ P1, with equality if and only if P = Ti for
some i = 2, 4, 6, . . . , p− 1.
(iii) lP (x) ≥ βFp for all P ∈ P2, with equality if and only if P = Ti for some
i = 1, 3, 5, . . . , p.
(iv) x is a Nash flow under the perceived latencies lp + δp.
Proof. The statements (i)–(iii) follow from Lemma 5.4, Lemma 5.5 and Lemma
5.6 in [11]. The last statement is clearly true for commodity 2 (since this com-
modity is not affected by the deviation on arc (s1, e)). For commodity 1, all the
flow-carrying paths Ti have a perceived latency of QTi(x) = 1+β(Fp+1), and the
perceived latency along any other (s1, t1)-path is greater or equal than that. The
actual latencies along these paths are lTi(x) = 1+βFp−1 for i = 2, 4, 6, . . . , p−1,
and lT0(x) = 1 + β(Fp−1 + 1). ⊓⊔
C.3 Proof of Theorem 6
Theorem 6. The Price of Risk Aversion for a common source multi-commodity
instance I with non-negative, non-decreasing latency functions, variance-to-
mean-ratio κ > 0 and risk-aversion parameter γ ≥ −1/κ is at most
PRA(I, γ, κ) ≤
{
1− γκ/(1 + γκ)⌈(n− 1)/2⌉r for −1/κ < γ ≤ 0
1 + γκ⌈(n− 1)/2⌉r for γ ≥ 0.
Moreover, these bounds are tight for all κ ≥ 0, γ ∈ (−1/κ,∞), r ≥ 1, and
n = 2m+ 1 ∈ N. For n = 2m ∈ N, we obtain
PRA(I, γ, κ) ≥
{
(1 + γκr⌈(n− 1)/2⌉)− γκ(r − 1) if γ ≥ 0
(1− γκ1+γκr⌈(n− 1)/2⌉) +
γκ
1+γκ (r − 1) if −1/κ < γ ≤ 0.
In particular, for single-commodity instances we obtain tightness for all n ∈ N.
Proof. Recall from the discussion in Section 2 that the deviations δa = γva can
be interpreted as θ-deviations with
θmina =
{
0 if γ ≥ 0
γκla if − 1/κ < γ ≤ 0
and θmaxa =
{
γκla if γ ≥ 0
0 if − 1/κ < γ ≤ 0.
Here, the restriction γ > −1/κ is necessary to satisfy Assumption 1. The theorem
now follows directly from Theorem 3, Example 1 and Theorem 4. ⊓⊔
C.4 Proof of Theorem 7
Theorem 7. Let I be a common source multi-commodity instance with non-
negative and non-decreasing latency functions (la)a∈A. Let f be a Nash flow
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with respect to (la)a∈A and let f˜ be a Nash flow with respect to slightly perturbed
latency functions (l˜a)a∈A satisfying
sup
a∈A, x≥0
∣∣∣∣ la(x)− l˜a(x)la(x)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ
for some small ǫ > 0. Then the relative error in social cost is (C(f˜ ) −
C(f))/C(f) ≤ 2ǫ/(1− ǫ)⌈(n− 1)/2⌉ · r = O(ǫrn).
Proof. Note that the perturbation l − l˜ can be seen as an (−ǫ, ǫ)-deviation.
Theorem 3 gives C(f˜)/C(f) ≤ 1+2ǫ/(1− ǫ)⌈(n−1)/2⌉ ·r. This implies that the
relative error in social cost is (C(f˜)−C(f))/C(f) ≤ 2ǫ/(1− ǫ)⌈(n− 1)/2⌉ · r =
O(ǫrn) for small ǫ > 0. ⊓⊔
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D Missing material of Section 5
D.1 Proof of Theorem 8
Theorem 8. Let L be a set of non-negative, non-decreasing and continuous
functions. Let I be a general multi-commodity instance with (la)a∈A ∈ L
A. Let
x be δ-inducible for some (0, β)-deviation δ and let z be an arbitrary feasible
flow. Then C(x)/C(z) ≤ (1 + β)/(1 − µˆ(L, β)) if µˆ(L, β) < 1. Moreover, this
bound is tight if L contains all constant functions and is closed under scalar
multiplication, i.e., for every l ∈ L and γ ≥ 0, γl ∈ L.
To see that the bound of Theorem 8 is not worse than the bound (1+β)/(1−
µ), note that (1, µ)-smooth latency functions we have µˆ(L, β) ≤ µˆ(L, 0) ≤ µ.
Proof (Theorem 8). We use a similar approach as Correa et al. [7]. Since x is
a deviated Nash flow with respect to l + δ, the following variational inequality
holds: ∑
a∈A
xa(la(xa) + δa(xa)) ≤
∑
a∈A
za(la(xa) + δa(xa)).
We then have
C(x) =
∑
a∈A
xala(xa) ≤
∑
a∈A
zala(xa) + (za − xa)δa(xa)
≤
∑
xa>za
zala(xa) +
∑
za≥xa
za(la(xa) + δa(xa))
≤
∑
xa>za
zala(xa) + (1 + β)
∑
za≥xa
zala(xa)
≤
∑
xa>za
zala(xa) + (1 + β)
∑
za≥xa
zala(za),
where in the last inequality, we use that xa ≤ za in the second summation.
We obtain
C(x) ≤
∑
xa>za
zala(xa) + (1 + β)
∑
za≥xa
zala(za)
=
∑
xa>za
za[la(xa)− (1 + β)la(za) + (1 + β)la(za)] + (1 + β)
∑
za≥xa
zala(za)
= (1 + β)C(z) +
∑
xa>za
za[la(xa)− (1 + β)la(za)]
≤ (1 + β)C(z) + µˆ(β)
∑
xa>za
xala(xa)
≤ (1 + β)C(z) + µˆ(β)C(x).
Thus, for µˆ(β) < 1, we obtain C(x)/C(z) ≤ (1 + β)/(1− µˆ(β)).
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)
Fig. 6. Example used in the proof of Theorem 8. The arcs are labeled by their respective
(la, δa) functions. Note that δ ∈ ∆(0, β).
We will now prove the tightness of the obtained bound if L contains all
constant functions and is closed under scalar multiplication. For a fixed c =
c(y) ∈ L, consider the parallel-arc instance in Figure 6 with fixed demand r.
Clearly, a deviated Nash flow is given by x = (x1, x2) = (r, 0), since then
l1(x1) + δ1(x1) = l2(x2) + δ2(x2) = (1 + β)/r. We have C(x) = (1 + β).
Let the social optimum be given by z∗ = (ǫ, r − ǫ). We have
C(z∗) =
(1 + β)ǫc(ǫ) + (r − ǫ)c(r)
rc(r)
=
rc(r) − ǫ[c(r) − (1 + β)c(ǫ)]
rc(r)
which implies that
C(x)
C(z∗)
= (1 + β)
(
1−
ǫ[c(r) − (1 + β)c(ǫ)]
r · c(r)
)−1
In order to claim tightness, let c ∈ L be such that it maximizes µˆ(L, β), i.e.,
µˆ(L, β) = sup
f,g≥0
f [c(g)− (1 + β)c(f)]
g · c(g)
.
Using this, we obtain
inf
ǫ,r≥0
{
1−
ǫ[c(r) − (1 + β)c(ǫ)]
r · c(r)
}
= 1− sup
ǫ,r≥0
ǫ[c(r)− (1 + β)c(ǫ)]
r · c(r)
,
which concludes the proof. ⊓⊔
D.2 Proposition 3 and Corollary 1
Proposition 3. Let L be the set of all affine latency functions with non-negative
coefficients. Then µˆ(L, β) = 1/(4(1 + β)).
Proof. Let la(y) = cay+ da be an arbitrary affine latency function with ca, da ≥
0. We need to show that
za[caxa + da − (1 + β)(caza + da)] ≤ 1/(4(1 + β))xa[caxa + da],
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or, equivalently,
ca[zaxa−(1+β)z
2
a]+da[za−za(1+β)] ≤ ca[1/(4(1+β))x
2
a]+da[1/(4(1+β))xa].
It suffices to show that zaxa − (1 + β)z
2
a ≤ 1/(4(1 + β))x
2
a and za − za(1 + β) ≤
1/(4(1 + β))xa. The second inequality is always true, using the non-negativity
of za, xa and β. For the first inequality, we have
0 ≤
(xa
2
− (1 + β)za
)2
= (1 + β)2z2a +
x2a
4
− (1 + β)xaza,
which implies that
[1 + β]
(
xaza − (1 + β)z
2
a
)
≤
x2a
4
.
Dividing this inequality by (1 + β) gives the desired result. Further, we have
tightness for (xa, za) = (1, 1/(2(1 + β))). ⊓⊔
Corollary 1. Let L be a set of non-negative, non-decreasing and continuous
functions (containing constants and closed under scalar multiplication). Let G
be the set of all instances with (la)a∈A ∈ L
A. If µˆ(L, β) < 1, then
|BPoA(G, (0, β)) −DR(G, (0, β))| ≤ (1 + β)
µˆ(L, β)
1 − µˆ(L, β)
.
For example, for affine latencies we have µˆ(L, β) = 1/(4(1 + β)) (see Propo-
sition 3). As a result, |BPoA(G, (0, β)) − DR(G, (0, β))| ≤ 1/3 for all β ≥ 0.
This implies that the gap is independent of the parameter β. This suggests that
for large β the Biased Price of Anarchy provides a good approximation for the
Deviation Ratio (or the Price of Risk Aversion). Note that this does not follow
from the bound 4(1+β)/3 for affine latencies obtained in [10,12] (resulting from
the upper bound (1 + β)/(1− µ) with µ = 1/4).
Proof (Corollary 1). Consider the instance dedicated in Figure 6. The Nash flow
with respect to δ = 0 is given by (c(r)/(1 + β), 1− c(r)/(1 + β)) with social cost
C(z) = 1. Further, as argued in the proof of Theorem 8, the deviated Nash flow
x has social cost C(x) = 1 + β. Thus,
C(x)
C(z)
= 1 + β ≤ DR(G, (0, β)) ≤ BPoA(G, (0, β)) ≤
1 + β
1− µˆ(L, β)
.
This implies that
|BPoA(G, (0, β))−DR(G, (0, β))| ≤
1 + β
1− µˆ(L, β)
− (1 + β)
= (1 + β)
(
1
1− µˆ(L, β)
− 1
)
.
⊓⊔
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D.3 General path deviations and proof of Theorem 9
Theorem 9. Let I be a general multi-commodity instance with (la)a∈A ∈ L
A. Let
x be δ-inducible with respect to some (0, β)-path deviation δ and let z an arbitrary
feasible flow. If µˆ(L, 0) < 1/(1+β), then C(x)/C(z) ≤ (1+β)/(1−(1+β)µˆ(L, 0)).
Proof. We know that the flow x satisfies the variational inequality∑
P∈P
xP [lP (x) + δP (x)] ≤
∑
P∈P
zP [lP (x) + δP (x)].
It follows that
C(x) ≤
∑
P∈P
xP [lP (x) + δP (x)] ≤
∑
P∈P
zP [lP (x) + δP (x)] ≤ (1 + β)
∑
P∈P
zP lP (x)
using the non-negativity of flow and deviations. Using the smoothness conditions,
we find∑
P∈P
zP lP (x) =
∑
a∈A
zala(xa) ≤
∑
a∈A
zala(za) +
∑
a∈A
µxala(xa) = C(z) + µC(x)
from which the result follows. ⊓⊔
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